FDK

EDITORIAL: RADAR SERVICE TERMINATED

by Mark R. Twombly

(from AOPA PILOT, July 1991, page 18)

A pilot training for an instrument rating learns to fly a full approachcross the initial approach fix, fly outbound for a minute or two, execute a procedure turn to get headed the opposite direction, and fly inbound on the final approach course while descending to decision altitude or the missed approach point. A full approach is a staple of instrument flying, yet some pilots rarely, if ever, have to fly one other than during initial or recurrency/proficiency training. That's because a full approach usually is required only when radar service is not available, and radar is available at most larger and busier instrument airports. Pilots come to expect radar vectors to final approach courses and that ATC will keep an electronic eye on them all the way to a successful conclusion of every approach.

Imagine, then, the surprise of the Air Force pilots ferrying then-President Ronald Reagan from Andrews Air Force Base to Frederick, Maryland, on October 21, 1988. At 4,000 feet, they were told by approach controllers at Baltimore-Washington International Airport that the Air Force One Gulfstream III was cleared for the ILS 23 at Frederick, and by the way, radar service was being terminated. Radar service terminated? The presidential pilots, along with Air Force C-12A pilots who preceded them into Frederick, later told National Transportation Safety Board investigators they had expected radar vectors to the final approach course.

In fact, radar coverage is not available at Frederick, at least not from Baltimore Approach, which is the controlling facility. Ironically, Dulles, which is about the same distance from Frederick as Baltimore, has a far better radar view of the Frederick area. Dulles radar controllers handling aircraft inbound to Frederick from the west and south often advise of traffic in the pattern at Frederick before handing pilots off to Baltimore for the approach. The folly of the situationbeing assigned to the jurisdiction of an ATC facility that has no radar coverage when another nearby approach control could provide much better servicehas had Frederick pilots complaining for years. But the issue took on much greater importance when the President entered the picture.

Except for the no-radar surprise, Air Force One and the C-12A made routine approaches and landing at Frederick that Friday evening. President Reagan debarked and immediately climbed into a car for the 15-mile drive to his weekend retreat at Camp David in the Catoctin hills north of Frederick. He probably was not aware that, about 20 minutes after he landed, a Piper Arrow crashed into a ridge not too far south of Camp David. The pilot of the Arrow had been cleared for the approach into Frederick, but for no discernible reason, the airplane wandered about 7 miles off the approach course and descended.

Baltimore Approach could not monitor the Arrow's flight path because its radar is not reliably effective below about 4,000 feet at Frederick, but Dulles Approach could and did. The pilot was being handled by Dulles before he was handed off to Baltimore. A plot of transponder replies shows that even after the hand-off, the Arrow was tracked by Dulles radar all the way to the point of impact. In 12 minutes of erratic flying, the Arrow triggered 39 minimum safe altitude warning alarms at Dulles Approach, yet Baltimore was never notified nor were any safety alerts radioed to the Arrow pilot.

In its final report on the accident, the NTSB noted that Baltimore's lack of radar coverage at Frederick affects all pilots who use the airport, including pilots of Air Force One. Frederick is designated as a reliever airport for the President when he is unable to helicopter to Camp David because of the kind of weather that was present on October 21, 1988. The safety board recommended that the FAA evaluate which ATC facility could provide the best radar service at Frederick and, if necessary, make a change.

Nearly three years after the accident and more than a year after the NTSB issued its report, the situation has remained exactly the same. Baltimore still controls instrument traffic into and out of Frederick. Baltimore does have a new ASR-9 radar, and the coverage at Frederick has improved, but controllers still are blind below about 3,000 feet. Dulles, which is awaiting an ASR-9 of its own, still has a much better view of Frederick traffic.

The NTSB and many pilots in the area are convinced that Frederick is assigned to Baltimore for political and economic reasonsto boost BWI traffic counts, which help determine controller pay scales. We have been assured that that is not the case, that the explanation is rooted in history. Dulles did not even exist when Baltimore was designated the controlling facility for Frederick.

Regardless, it makes no sense to perpetuate an obvious safety problem. Frederick should be switched to Dulles Approach Control. The issue has implications that go far beyond Frederick. Pilots who operate at airports not well-served by ATC radar should ask hard questions about why the service is not available. They may discover it is.